Footpaths for a Green Deal.

The fall of the Liberal-Productivist model and its alternative.

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The crisis officially opened by the krach of Lemon Brothers certainly deserves the label granted by the « Regulation Approach » : a Great crisis. That is : the end of a capitalist model of development. This collapsing model, whose rule stretched out from the end of Fordist period (around the « Monetarist shift », 1980) to nowadays, has been sometimes labelled « neo-liberal », sometimes « liberal-productivist ». Now that it meets its own crisis, this double character, both liberal and productivist, seems to be ratified by the double origin of its crisis, according to the Hegelian rule that « Minerva’s owl takes off at the fall of the night ». And from the double character of its crisis stems the double solution, social and ecologist, it requires.

The present paper is dedicated to ecologist aspects of the solution. Too often, a green touch is imposed upon a mere keynesian analysis of the crisis, as a “supplément d’âme”, a green-washing imposed by opinion's mood. On the contrary, we shall try to root the necessity of a green solution into the ecological aspect of the crisis. In order to do so, we are to question the nature of the model in crisis, and the mechanisms of its crisis. In fact, “a model has the conjuncture of its structure”.

Ah ! What a terrible structure of this model, what a fascinating conjuncture of its crisis! As a “liberal capitalist” crisis, it has much to do with the the Great Depression of the Thirties. As an “ecological” crisis, it evokes the “Ancient Regime” crisis à la Fernand Braudel, and its last example, the european crisis of 1848.

Like in the Thirties, the crisis starts in the financial sphere but soon reveals its social and macro-economic origin : workers are too poor, profits too high, a crisis of over-accumulation (or under-consumption) was unavoidable. Solution : increase the wage, and sell a (black) car to everybody, as Henry Ford puts it. And enlarge money supply, save credit
economy, as JM Keynes puts it. But, as in the eighteen-forties (and contrary to the nineteen-thirties), Earth was so poorly generous to Humankind in 2007 and 2008 that basic consumption goods turned too expensive. The demand for capitalist durable goods was crowded out by the demand for staple commodities: food and energy. In reality, this miserliness of the Planet is nothing but the structural outcome of the productivist character of recent capitalist models. Thus, a Fordist-Keynesian solution would immediately trigger a new fall into the crisis: a fourth oil shock, a second alimentary shock. And that is probably the state we are in, in this bleak September 2010.

On the other hand, a mere “green-washing” of a business-as-usual recovery policy, ignoring the depth of inequalities at the root of the “liberal” dimension of the economic crisis and the necessity of social reforms, would be a symmetrical mistake. The financial, social and ecological aspects of the crisis are so tightly interwoven that no partial solution could be efficient.

Hence the structure of this paper. First, we sum up the components of the late model of capitalist development. Second, we scrutinise the interweaving of factors of crisis in the recession of 2007-2009. Third, after a short survey of the various aspects of a global New Deal, we develop more extensively the blue-prints for a specifically “Green” Deal.


According to the Regulation Approach, a model of capitalist development permits for a while a relatively stable path of capitalist accumulation, despite the contradictions of its social relations. It could be described as follows:

- a technological paradigm: the way waged-work is organised;
- a regime of accumulation: the stable structure of effective social demand allowing for the smooth realisation (selling) of capitalist supply and orienting profits to new investments;
- a mode of regulation: the set of institutions and routines inducing agents to act in accordance with the regime;
- an international configuration: the compatibility between the various socio-economic national formations following various models and exchanging goods and capitals on the world market.
Such a methodology has been developed in the study of the central post-WWII model, Fordism, and its crisis around 1975-80. It permitted an early identification of the new competing models, and the analysis of the “winner”, Liberal-Productivism (LP).

a. Repressive taylorism.

One of the components of the crisis of Fordism was the exhaustion of productivity gains stemming from its technological paradigm, “taylorism”, that is a strict division between conception and execution aspects of labour, and a prescription of tasks from conceptors to operators. In the LP model, taylorism was extended to tertiary jobs and exacerbated through pressure on “results” (lean management, then “stress” and even “crash” management). That shift from « prescription » to « repression » entails a steep increase in stress, suicides, professional diseases etc. That occurred both in old industrial countries and in “emerging industrial powers”.

Note that, in the 80’s, an alternative appeared to be possible, based on high skill and “negotiated involvement of workers” (or, according to Toyota example, “ohnism”). This alternative, highly praised in the famous *The second industrial divide* (Piore & Sabel) imposed its superiority in some countries or niches (Scandinavia, partly Germany and Japan). Yet it remained minority at the world level, because the combination « repressive taylorism + social dumping » is more competitive than « negotiated involvement + decent works » in most branches.

b. Trickle-down regime and credit economy.

In Fordism, social demand was pulled by popular demand, based on wages increasing at the same step as productivity. In LP model, the gap between productivity gains and reduced wages (at the world level) turned into increasing profit share. Profits were partly distributed to property owners and spent out (trickled-down) to waged producers of leisure goods and services, and partly invested. While, in Fordism, capitalists lives on what workers spend, in LP regime workers live on what the riches spend. But, since trickle-down was insufficient to provide social demand for exhilarating investment, credits had to be distributed to insolvable consumers. The LP regime thus appeared to be as “consumerist” and “productivist” as Fordism, but growth anticipations (unstead of planing or regulation) was the very condition for the stability of growth!

c. Neo-liberalism
Contrary to the well regulated Fordism, public and contractual regulation faded away in the LP regime. As in the typical pre-WW II period of *laissez faire*, the belief in self-regulating power of markets prevailed. And as in this classical “liberal” period, business cycles came-back. Yet neo-liberalism did not forget all the blessings of Fordist “keynesian” mode of regulation. Not only did public expenditures maintain their path (but on credit, since taxes were reduced). But even private consumers benefited from a huge creation of monetary mass through the development of private credits. Indeed credit itself turned into a form of private money with legal tender, and private banks levying a private seignorage... even on public debt (spread). As a result, a growing share of social surplus-value was appropriated by private banks with a reduction, not only of wage-share in GDP, but of entrepreneurs'profit-share.

**d. Chinamerica.**

The transition from Fordism to LP (early 80s) was soon met by two important global economic changes : the generalization of “new industrialisation” in the third world (which started in the 70s in the first “NICs”) and the fall of Soviet empire and model (in the 90s). The result was a complete reorganisation of the hierarchy of competitiveness, production and powers.

Germany and Japan succeeded in adopting some forms of “negotiated involvement” as a technological paradigm, at least in some niches, and became more competitive than USA.

As a form of transition to LP model, USA, UK and France accepted a shift of their weakly skilled industries or manufacturing tasks to the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). Thus, their trade balance became structurally negative.

The fall of Soviet empire accelerated the move of China and India to a form of “peripheral fordism” within an ocean of poverty. Russia did not follow, and limited itself to the role of energy-exporting country.

While in Asia most NICs had formatted their export industries to the level of their foreign debt, indebted Latin-American countries had to suffer strong “adjustment plans”. Yet, by the beginning of XXIst century, after the Korean and Tequila crisis, most NICs had paid for their debt and were accumulating huge commercial surplus. These “Emerging Countries” became lenders in last resort.

That was made possible because in USA main agents were in deficit (households because of stagnating wages, administration because of Reaganomics belief in the good
effects of cutting taxes) and so was national trade balance. But the very low interest rates of the Fed permitted the development of “debt economy” and later “casino economy”.

Debt economy was permitted in the West (notably in USA) because Emerging Countries (notably China) had no alternative than dollar as a monetary means of reserve. In turn, the impossibility to sell theses reserves of dollars maintained their rate of change at excessively low level, thus fostering their competitiveness but allowing US agents to buy their labour at low price and on credit. This “terror equilibrium” was the basis of the world configuration of LP regime, and labelled “Chinamerica”.

II The crisis of Liberal-Productivism.

Many endogenous explanations could be given for the break-down of LP model, since it was obviously based on a heap of capitalist contradictions, already identified by classical economist of XIXe century (including Ricardo and Marx). The “miracle” was the incredible success of the superstition of “self regulating markets”, when LP model was precisely so similar to the “Roaring Twenties” model criticised by K. Polanyi!

Indeed, standard explanations to the crisis of 1929 came immediately to the front after the the crash of Lehman Brothers in 2008. And of course, all of them captured an aspect of reality, since a major crisis is always multi-layered. But in the present crisis, a new aspect appears, invisible in all crises of the XXth century : the development of an ecological crisis. It is not absolutely “new”. That was a general character of all major crises until 1848 ! But it is new for developed capitalism. So new that Marx, Keynes, Regulation Approach and Mainstream were able to ignore it in their analysis of all post-1848 crises...

a. Between Minsky and Keynes : the mainstream approaches

Being a “debt economy model”, the LP model was condemned to fall on the side of its most obvious sin: a debt crisis followed by a stream of bankruptcies, and then a credit crunch. That happened when the weaker agents of US society, the poor workers and lower middle classes, were induced to buy their housing on credit at “subprime” rate. When they revealed their insolvency, all the banking system became illiquid, and after an unfortunate attempt to avoid “moral hazard” (refusal to bail-out Lehmond Brothers), the States had to rescue all the world of finance.
The most mainstream conclusion was: market works, but some agents on market are so stupid as to ignore its signals. That was already the mainstream understanding of 1929, that is the most mainstream understanding of present crisis. “Let us go on, business as usual, but, this time, watch your step.”

A deeper vision adds immediately: “When things are right, an exhilarating, self-fostering financial bubble will form itself, until an excess of credit will lead to an inflation of titles, thus leading to a krach, and an excess of carefulness leading to credit crunch. And that was what we had announced”. Technically: a crisis within the Minsky cycle. The solution will be: first fix up a new start with cancelation or rescheduling of some debts, then: more control (organised at international level, since finance is international more than ever), stronger prudential rules, stronger supervision. A “Super Glass-Steagal Act”.

Both the analysis and the solution are correct. But extremely insufficient. For: why were lenders so greedy? Why the borrowers so indebted? Because the lenders (notably pension funds) had to raise money for their entitled (retired workers and renters), and because the borrowers were too poor. In a debt economy, the root of the problem is not finance but bad distribution of revenues (primary or after tax). If LP model did work despite insufficient primary effective demand, it is because poor consumers could get accommodating credits. But not all of them, not the poor producers of emerging countries in the south, only the poor workers and middle class in the north-west of the World. So we need a New Deal, but at the world level, including chinese and indian working classes. A “Super Wagner Act”, and probably a Super Tennessee Valley Authority, a Super Marshall Plan... at the world level: increase wages and cancel popular debts.

Clearly it is also true. And clearly China, which has indefinite reserves of potential inner demand because of its incredible wage-productivity gap, and has a ready-made Big Government, and has no external financial constraint, activated with success this “Super Keynesian policy mix”. Yet... would a Global New Deal, American Way of Life for every human being, be ecologically sustainable? Certainly not. And the strange think is that the concept of “sustainable”, inherent to the very concept of “regime”, only breaks out in economics at this point!

b. The emergence of sustainability constraint in Liberal-Productivist Model.

The sustainability constraint was brought to elite's notice by Stockholm UN Conference (1972) and the publication of the famous model *Limits to Growth* by Club of Rome. But at the
time warnings were still imprecise and focused on the “source” side of ecological problems: the scarcity of resources. The Oil Shock (1973) outlined dependency of Fordist model to oil supply, but this supply seemed to be limited only by geo-strategical reasons. Nothing more than the classical wars for energy and primary goods: you control the source, and the problem is resolved. Few people still believe that the crisis of Fordist model stems from the Oil Shock, even if it surely contributed.

At the beginning, the LP Model did not care for any ecological constraint, nor did the Regulation Approach, nor Radical economists. On the contrary, the Oil Counter-shock of 1985-86 revealed an availability of oil that could yet appear infinite. In fact, everybody knew that resources were finite, but believed the limits to be beyond political or business horizon. In fact, the counter-shock is now interpreted as a trick of President Reagan, the CIA and Saudi Arabia to secure the total victory of the LP Model, by killing the power of OPEC and weakening oil-exporting Soviet economy. Anyway, the very possibility of such a plan proves that flooding the world market with oil was not a problem, during the first years of LP model!

Things did change with acid rains, depletion of ozone layer and with Earth Summit (UNCED) of Rio in 1992. There, most ecological problems were exposed in full terms: not only the “source side” but the “sink side”. Not only were natural resources scarce, but the production of waste (notably carbon dioxyde and nuclear wastes) were a serious threat for the sustainability of decent life and even of capitalist production on the earth.

Besides “productivity of labour and of capital”, new concepts arouse within growth theory, such as: “content of energy and carbon by unit of GDP”. And besides the labour/capital contradiction, a “second contradiction of capitalism” was vindicated (O’Connor): Nature/capital. And there was no hope that a new Kaldor-Verdoon equation would resolve the problem by an automatic increase of energy-efficiency with growth. On the contrary, the whole story appeared as a revenge of Malthus and Ricardo crisis theory: a reduction of profitability for farmers, due to growing cost of natural resources and waste problems. The difference with Ricardo theory of increasing land rent is that increase of ecological footprint has been free for Capital… up to now. But once these costs are made explicit, is it possible that technical progress incorporated in investment could reduce it? A new field of investigation for Regulation approach: what could be an ecologically sustainable regime of accumulation, what could be the mode of regulation for such a model, is there a technological paradigm increasing the “productivity of energy (and emitted CO2)” at high speed?
In fact, the debate scattered out between many participants. Engineers and designers attacking directly the efficiency problem, ecological economists building up modes of regulation (from ecotaxes to tradable permits), activist insisting that the safer energy is the one which is neither consumed nor produced. But few confronted themselves with the global “alternative model” problem. There was no hurry: the world elite forgot very quickly Rio warnings, and the neo-liberal model appeared more and more as a “Liberal Productivist” model.

Yet, serious wind tempests in Europe began to worry the Insurance sector. Climate change was no more a threat for “future generations”, but an immediate problem for the profession. Hence the success in European elites of the Berlin and Tokyo conferences against climate change. Unfortunately, liberalism was progressing at the same step. While a change in the model of development implies a huge political involvement at the world level, the creation of the World Trade Organisation reduced again the capacity of political powers to move on. The Johannesburg CNUED (2002) concluded with a stalemate between liberal dogma and ecologist proclamations. The ecological world crisis had a free road.

c. Outburst of the ecological crisis.

By 2007 the roaring growth of emerging countries met the limits of current oil production capacities. The oil price, which had been increasing from 2002, took-off towards unprecedented peaks. We are not discussing here whether production had reached an absolute limit (Hubber's oil peak) or not: anyway, there was a demand peak.

But soon the food problem joint the oil/climate problem. It was also a result of the emerging countries shift in demand: more middle classes means adoption of a meat-based alimentation, and meat needs some 10 times more space than traditional vegetal proteins. And at the same time, the first effects of climate change were developing. Directly: a years-persistent drought cut the supply from the traditional world grain loft: Australia. And, indirectly, the very answer of productivism to its energy-climate crisis, namely the development of agro-fuels, increased the food problem. This nexus is called the “FFFF” dilemma on land-use priorities: Food, Feed (for cattle), Fuel or Forest (that is: reserves of biodiversity and carbon sink).

The macroeconomic outcome of the FFFF nexus was the take-off of food prices. A tragedy in the LDC, which had been committed by World Bank and IMF to give-up local traditional food crops: a wave of hunger riots swept the Third World. And “just” an increase
in the cost of living in the North. As a result, the “subprime” indebted poor households in USA had to choose: pay for food, for car fuel, or for housing. And they gave up their mortgaged houses to banks, depressing deeply the housing market... and ruining the banks! For the first time in capitalist history since 1848, a bad crop triggered a crisis à la Fernand Braudel. But, this time, the bad crop did not fall from the sky, but from the liberal reforms of agrocapitalist model in the previous decades and from the very model of capitalist development in industry and urbanism.

d. The state we are in (summer 2010)

When, after two years of bailing-out of banking system and injection of budgetary demand, a pale recovery manifested itself in the old capitalist countries, while emerging countries were following their roaring expansion, immediately the same problems reappeared. The difference with 2006-2008 period was that debt had shifted from private agents to sovereign debt. And immediately, banks started to bite the hands that had bailed them out. The “Greek crisis” signified that the “liquidity crisis” was finished, the “solvability problem” was beginning. And nothing has been done on the revenue-repartition problem: the poor, unemployed and retired workers are just a bit poorer, and the rich have lost a part of their fictitious assets but have returned to their pre-crisis revenues. Hence the permanence of the ecological crisis, worsened by the failure of the Climate conference in Copenhagen.

Same causes, same outcome. A second and third grain lofts (Ukraine and Russia) went off in smoke this summer, due to unprecedented drought and heat wave. And, already, a new wave of hunger riots has started in Mozambique. There will be no exit to this great crisis without a change in the whole model, and in particular without a strong shift in the climate-energy nexus. The IPCC and Stern reports have outlined the limited window for action: from 2010 to 2020.

III. Blueprint for a Green Deal.

Two years has been lost, and precisely in the field which could not be delayed. In the multilayer crisis, some layers can wait: it is better to reform at once, but until break-down happens, another year is just as good a year. On the contrary, the same ecologist action has a result totally different if it occurs in 2010 or in 2020.
Most debates has and will focus on one of the regulating forms of LP Model: the regulation of finance. Should the “Stability Pact” of EU be strengthened, or on the contrary its “laxist” reform of 2005 developed into discretionary budgetary policies? Should ECB finance any public deficit? Are the reforms of prudential rules and supervision of financial system adopted in USA, EU and BIRD (Bale III) sufficient? These are important questions. But focusing on them exclusively only means reducing the crisis to a Minsky crisis. Yes, we need a super Glass-Steagall Act, but it is not sufficient.

Even the debate on the sharing-out of Gross Domestic Product (in order to foster effective demand) would not be sufficient. Yes, we are in a keynesian crisis, or a Marxist “underconsumption” crisis, but:

- On the one hand, redistribution implies not only domestic economic space, but a global deal. For the workers are in the south and consumers in the north. And there is no global government to ratify the deal.

- On the other hand, a super international Wagner Act (or a Wagner +Marshall Act) implies a choice: should the increase of world wage-share take the shape of an increase of purchasing-power or an increase of free time? Ecological sustainability constraint suggest that, in the North as in the South, reduction of labour time should have priority (under different forms: prohibition of child-labour in the south, reduction of yearly labour in the north, advancement of retirement everywhere).

Thus, the regime of accumulation should be “green”, as far as labour-time is concerned. But it should be outlined that social effective demand should be green, too, and green the technological paradigm ruling supply.

Let us focus on EU, since EU encompass a rich economic space of half-a-billion human beings with huge differences in revenues, and EU is given of a minimum federal state apparatus - quite insufficient indeed - to handle a Green Deal.

In the next thirty years – the duration of a whole model of development - EU will have too reduce its production of greenhouse gas by a factor 4. This target should be the directing parameter of planing and policies. It implies changes at the level of technological paradigm, models of production, models of consumption, logic of the regime of accumulation. Clearly the first condition is that “progress” should be measured by free-time rather than increase in material consumption. But such “soberness” will be far from sufficient.
We need huge investment in new energy-saving and CO2-saving facilities (in housing and transportation) and new “clean”, renewable sources of energy and primary goods. Moreover, other crisis such as food-wealth crisis will have to be settled. In a Green model of development, public demand (for transportation systems) or at least organised demand (for heat isolation of existing buildings) will be dominant and will substitute the role of car industry in the Fordist model.

Thus, Green Model will look like a “mobilised economy” à la Kornai, that is commended by demand, and mainly semi-public demand. From the regulation point of view, new problems arise. They are quite similar to a “reconstruction problem” (period 1945-1950), but addressing to decentralised agents: households and firms struggling to save their income from increasing price of “dirty “ energy, local authorities committed to build transportation system...

Ecotax and tradable permits (that is: planning in price or in quantity) will be a great help to the regulation of decentralised decision processes. But it is not sufficient to be “induced to invest” in energy-CO2-devices. Agents will need credit, since they will have to invest now for future incomes and savings. A Green Model will be also a debt economy! But contrary to LP Model, the debt contracting and lending processes will have to be strictly oriented to the social and ecological goals of investment. Like in the Reconstruction and Fordit period, selectivity of credit and money creation is awaited. The most straightforward is to think of a distribution of “easy money” by European Investment Bank, oriented by green criteria, with the possibility for EIB to refinance these credits at 0% rate near ECB.

In general, “mobilised economy”, that is semi-public demand-driven economies are extremely job-creating because the propensity to consume and invest is close to 1, or above 1 (that is: debt-economy). Studies had been made for a typical green program in EU (reduce by 30% CO2 emission by 2020 and reaching a rate of 40% bio-food). Gathering evaluation of EU Commission and ETUC, P. Canfin estimated an increase of 10.5 million jobs (in EU) by comparison to business-as-usual path.

Typically: “creative destruction” through the green revolution in transportation would suppress 4.5 million jobs in the production of individual cars, while creating 8 millions jobs in collective transportation. Indeed, the new model will have to build tracks, rails, trains, metro, tramways, buses, and in addition... to drive all that, or control their automatic move.
A very interesting evaluation. First it confirms that “ecology is not the enemy of jobs”. More precisely, it indicates a decrease of apparent labour productivity in transport sector. In reality, this results from two factors.

- In general, historical gains in labour productivity were realised through increase of the coefficients of capital and “Nature”, Nature designating the free gifts of environment (“Land”, in classical economics). Through some Cobb-Douglas function, the more nature-saving, the more labour-intensive: a Green shift in the model of development will substitute labour to “natural” input (i.e. energy). And this labour will be less “industrial” (car assembly lines) and more “craft”, more “industrious” (shorter series of wagons, dedicated infrastructures, driving of bus). A very important move in the technological paradigm, inducing a mobilisation of the professional training system.

- More specifically, “Nature” (the External Conditions of Capitalist Accumulation, as Marx puts it) includes... free-time of workers. The difference between cars and trams, for commuters, is that waged workers drive the trams, while commuting workers drive their car “freely” for their employers. There is a hidden, unpaid labour within individual transports. The same occurs when a woman take care “freely” of children and elderly persons of her family. A Green model will substitute this hidden labour of reproduction within patriarchy by some form of social co-operatives.

New studies by P. Quirion translated the same EU “Green program for 2020”, first to French economy, then to Ile-de-France (Paris region), using an economic model combining input-output matrices - with a distinction between direct and indirect (investment, input) jobs - and a second round of “keynesian effects” (spending less money in oil, households create local jobs with their increased purchasing power). The results of variants appear to be very sensitive to:

- Oil price: clearly, a new, or rather permanent oil shock will be depressing on the rest of domestic demand, thus “induced jobs” by energy-savings would increase.

- Ambitions about the speed of transition to low-carbon economy. Of course, fixing a goal of -40% CO2 by 2020 creates much more jobs than the present -30% EU target.

- Availability of credit. A first variant implies no increase of public debt. A second variant makes the assumption that 50% of “post-Kyoto imperatives” investment may be borrowed at low interest rate. The second variant creates much more “induced” jobs, for, in the first variant, increases in taxes absorbs the reduction of households oil bill.
CONCLUSION

The post-crisis model of development may not be reduced to a reform of finance prudential rules and supervision, even an ambitious one. Due to its common character with the Thirties, present crisis needs a more Rooseveltian or Fordist New Deal between Capital and Labor. But this crisis is not a mere reproduction of the Great Depression. As in the “Ancient Régime” crises à la Braudel, the “Humankind/Nature” nexus is at the core of the problem, this time in a structural way. No New Deal could lead to a sustainable regime if it is not a Green Deal.

The Green Deal entails dramatic changes from the Liberal-Productivist model, but it could not be a revival of Good Old Fordism (even at world level). Ecological sustainability is now a decisive character required by any regime. Some sketches of the Green Model of development already appears:

A technological paradigm input-saving, labour-intensive, based on industrious, skilled forms of work with a negotiated involvement of workers.

A regime of accumulation distributing gains in productivity more generously to wage-owners, in priority under the form of free time, and driven by semi-public demand of green investment and common goods,

A mode of regulation based on more stable capital-labour relations with incentive environmental planning through ecotax and tradable permits, and creation of money supply directly dedicated to green investments,

An international configuration based on cooperation between old and emerging powers in the promotion of social and environmental common rules, probably organised through continental-size eco-economic-political blocks, with a super Marshall Plan towards LDC.

Some will think this sketch a fairy tale. Let us remember that Karl Polanyi, who identified correctly the Great Depression as a collapse of the “self-regulating market” that could only destroy Nature, Labour and Machines, correctly forecast that the alternative would be more interventionist. But interventionism could take three forms: fascist, Stalinist or social-democratic. Actually, in the first years after Black Monday, recessionist economic liberalism remained untouched, with Hoover, Chamberlain, Laval... In the last years of the decade, interventionism had won everywhere, but in general under the most totalitarian forms,
fascism and stalinism. Only the anti-fascist victory permitted the triumph of social democratic market economy in the West, when Stalinism progressed in the east.

A Green Model is necessary, but its shape is still open. Let it be as social, democratic and efficient as could be.