The Development Ethics Paradigm: Ethical Goals and Strategies for an Authentic Development

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Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to analyze development in a value-based context using a paradigm based on development ethics. After a brief navigation of the ethical study of development, the paper introduces to the origins and fundamental principles of the development ethics. For development ethicists the true indicator of development is the qualitative enrichment of human beings in all relevant aspects of human life. Above all, development, draw upon ancient ethical issues of the meaning of life, social justice, and the human stance towards nature. The present analysis unfolds a conceptual framework responding to these queries based on the pioneering work of the development ethicist, Denis Goulet. The development ethics paradigm consists on targeting the ethical goals of development and the ethical strategies of attaining these goals. Ultimately, the notion of development is redefined on ethical foundations within the concept of authentic development which is considered as the means and the end in this course of action.

1. Introduction

For many years development has been perceived as a straightforward economic issue. Orthodox economists, policy makers, governors, interregional organizations and so on, confront the problem of underdevelopment in an instrumental and administrational way. History has shown that this functional approach cannot provide answers to the issue of development. It is easy to measure the problem but difficult to solve it. Contemporary worldwide status quo proves that no considerable distance has been covered with regard to ordinary problems such as water scarcity, famine, and bad sanitary conditions in the non-developed third world. At the same time, within developed countries, new problems come to the fore, with massive consumption on the one side and new massive social groups under the poverty line on the other. Moreover on an international scale, even in cases that development in terms of growth or industrial expansion has taken place, e.g. China and/or India, the ecological destruction is huge. Hence, development should be re-
examined under considerations that arose from the ethical question of ‘development for what?’

Development ethics aspires to show the road towards a new development paradigm that investigates development in light of fundamental ancient ethical queries on the meaning of the good life, the foundation of justice in society and the human stance towards nature. The study of development ethics attempts to discuss and codify the aforementioned ethical queries borrowing scientific instruments from economists, political studies, anthropologists, environmental scientists and others. Thus, it can be characterized as an interdisciplinary area. To this effort, the contribution of Denis Goulet is distinctive. He offers the conceptual frame and gives the dimensions of a relatively new field of study. The present analysis pays significant attention to Goulet’s life tribute and particularly to his theory on development goals and strategic principles of achieving these goals as well as the concept of authentic development. Many prominent scholars, among them Dower (1988), Crocker (1991; 1998; 2008), Clark (2002), Gasper (2006), incorporate the methodological principles of Goulet with regards to development ethics approach, maintaining their own antinomies. In this paper, a synthesis of Goulet’s literature and ideas to present a comprehensive ethical proposal for development is attempted.

In terms of structure and conceptual navigation of the paper, after the introductory section, a discussion on the prologue of ethical study in development follows. This section talks about the rise of an ethical thought within social sciences. The third section considers the concept of development ethics by providing a definition and its origins. The fourth section demonstrates Goulet’s noteworthy role in the formulation of a development ethics consensus. The fifth section analyzes the ethical goals of development and the ethical strategies in achieving these goals. The sixth section deals with the notion of authentic development in contrary to conventional concepts. Last section concludes the remarks of the paper.

2. A brief view to the Ethical Study of Development

During the 20th century, for many economists, particularly in lines of orthodox economics, development was viewed as a conventional problem of economic growth in terms of the increase of material goods. The technological expansion, the boost of the production, the sense that people could overcome nature, led many economists, government officials and planners to an ‘engineering’ approach to the concept of development. Development was perceived as an absolutely measurable matter, as a synonymous of economic growth- the variation of GDP for instance. Ethical inquiries on the concept of development were viewed mostly as an affair for philosophers and humanists than economists. Regarding the debate within ethics and economics, Robbins (1945, p. 148) asserts that “[u]nfortunately it does not seem logically possible to associate the two studies in any form but mere juxtaposition. Economics

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2 Denis Goulet (1931-2006) was Emeritus Professor at the University of Notre Dame. A pioneer in the interdisciplinary study of development ethics, he had conducted field research in Algeria, Lebanon, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka and Mexico. He has held visiting professorships in Canada (University of Saskatchewan), USA (Indiana University and University of California), France (IRFED), Brazil (University of Pernambuco), and Poland (Warsaw University). His publications record includes eleven books and over 160 articles and monographs (CV elements retrieved in 2007 from Denis Goulet’s website: http://www.nd.edu/~dgoulet/).

3 The term ‘engineering’ refers to Amartya Sen’s division of the origins on the study of Economics (Sen, 1987)
deal with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations. The two fields of
enquiry are not on the same plane of discourse”. Robbins expresses the vein in
economic study that perceives economics as a science which takes place after the
elucidation of moral and ethical propositions.

On the other hand, there are those that advocate the coexistence of ethical
justifications and humanistic ideas with rational economic methodology. This
includes the discussion between means and ends in human development. Hardison
and Myers [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 37)] underline that “there need be no conflict
between the economists and the humanists…The development of man for himself
may still be considered the ultimate end but economic progress can also be one of the
principal means of attaining it”. Clark (2002) also suggests a closer relation of
philosophers and social scientists in the field of development. He argues that even a
great attempt has been made towards this direction; more empirical work is needed in
order for ethical considerations (such as ‘what is good life’) to be adjusted to real
development practices. Other influential studies in the social science perspective
within the context of an ethical justification of development include those of Seer
(1972), Bruton (1990), Griffin (1986), Qizilbash (1996), and Nussbaum (2000).

For economists, the perception that economic policy as well as economic
efficiency hinges on deontological ethics has gradually been established in works
such as e.g. Polanyi (1944), Arrow (1974), Hirsch (1976), Sen (1974), Hirschman
(1993, pp. 672-78) codify the reasons why economists should be interested in moral
questions. Accordingly, i) the morality of agents affects their behaviour and as a
consequence the economic upshots, ii) welfare economics lies on morals
presumptions, iii) public policies are driven by moral commitments which should be
linked with economic results, and finally iv) positive and normative economics are
often intertwined, so that even positive concerns contain moral presuppositions. The
authors argue that, “economists who refuse to ‘dirty their hands’ with ethical matters
will not know what technical problem to investigate” (p. 672).

The contribution of Amartya Sen is crucial to the introduction of ethical
justifications and humanistic approach to social sciences, economics as well as
development studies [e.g. Sen (1974; 1980; 1981; 1984; 1989; 1999)]. Sen is one of
the central figures having an influence to the equity issue within theories of justice.
He also contributes to the ethical affairs by perceiving the expansion of freedom as
both the primary end and the principal means of development. Sen (1989) in his
influential book On Ethics and Economics draws a bridge across ethical matters and
economic rationality. He advocates that the study of moral philosophy is inevitably
necessary to the study of economics. Fine (2004) highlights the significance of Sen’s
contribution to the ethical study of economics as well as development and the need for
further investigation.

It would be unfair not to underline that in contemporary economic thought,
development is broadly defined as economic growth plus social change. A strong
supporter of this approach to development is the United Nations which speaks for
economic and social development. The concept of a human development paradigm is
extensively accepted. According to Haq (n.d), founder of the Human Development
Report, “[t]he basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices... The
objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy
long, healthy and creative lives”. In our times, as stated in the lines of the official
planner of United Nations, humanness is at the core of the discussion.
3. Definition and Origins of Development Ethics

Development ethics comes to fill the gap in the ethical study of development by a holistic, defined in a macro level, normative and practical way. According to Nigel Dower, former president of International Development Ethics Association (IDEA)\(^4\), “[i]nternational development ethics is the ethical reflection on the ends and means of local, national and global development” (Dower, n.d). From the same perspective, Crocker (1991; 1998, 2008) defines development ethics as an ethical deliberation on the ends and means of socioeconomic change in poor countries and regions and mainly focuses on the element of poverty and the division between rich and poor countries – North and South – under moral issues. Development ethics combines tasks and methodological instruments from a variety of scientific fields such as economics, political sciences, religious studies, anthropology, environmental studies, ecology and other. Thereby it can be characterized as a multidisciplinary area of study, or as Gasper (2006, p. 1) states as an “interdisciplinary meeting place”. To me, through its traits of combining multidimensional knowledge and practices it can also be defined as a novel human development paradigm. Goulet (1997, p. 1168) describes it as a kind of ‘disciplined eclecticism’, as he argues “eclectic in its choice of subject matter but disciplined in its study of it”.

Regarding its origins, development ethics can be characterized as a relatively new field of study (Goulet, 1995, 1997; Clark, 2002). Even though the ethical question of ‘what is a good life?’ and the term ‘eudemonia’ –a synonymous of happiness - trace back to ancient Greek philosophers and particularly to Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ (Aristotle in Crisp ed, 2000), the cultivation of moral and ethical issues regarding development studies and the formulation of development ethics such as came to the front with the rise of an economic and humanistic movement in 1950s. This humanistic approach of the economy and society is theoretically represented by the French economist Louis Joseph Lebret and his student American Denis Goulet and defines development “as the basic question of values and the creation of a new civilization” [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 6)]. Mohandas Gandhi in India and the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal could be labeled as precursors of development ethics (Goulet, 1997, pp. 1961-64).

4. Denis Goulet’s contribution to Development Ethics

Denis Goulet could be considered the father of development ethics as a self-conscious area of study. His contribution to the interdisciplinary area of development ethics has been significant by presenting a long distance tribute [e.g. Goulet (1970; 1971; 1974a; 1974b; 1975; 1976; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1991; 1992a; 1992b, 1995; 1996; 1997; 2000; 2006)]. Goulet poses a conceptual frame of an ethical conflict in the process of development and his contribution to the study of development is not only normative but also practical. He offers a comprehensive analysis of development, from an ethical view, by formulating general principles in almost all relevant aspects of development: technology for development, ecology and ethics, culture and tradition, the ethic of aid, etc. From this angle, development is perceived as many

aspects conjointly, “simultaneously and inextricably an economic and political matter, a social and cultural one, an issue of resource and environmental management, a question of civilization” (Goulet, 1995, p. 2).

More precisely, according to Goulet (1997, p. 1165), three ancient ethical questions should be incorporated in the ethical concept of development: 1) “What is the good life?” concerning the discussion around the relation of having goods and being good. 2) “What are the foundations of justice in society?” 3) “What stance should human groups adopt towards nature?” In his leading book entitled *The Cruel Choice: A new Concept in Theory of Development* (1975 [1971]) Goulet identifies three development goals, namely, life sustenance, esteem, and freedom, and demonstrates three ethical strategies across the development effort, those of, i) universal solidarity, ii) abundance of goods as a prerequisite to people’s humaneness, and iii) populace representation to the matters of public interest and people’s control over their destiny.

Goulet highlights a twofold ambiguity regarding the concept of development and how it is accessed by development ethics. Initially, he ascertains that development is used either descriptively or normatively. Then, the term “development” usually refers to the end of a social change. In the first case, Goulet places the qualitative and moral elements to the applied methods in connection with a normative approach (1992b). In the second case, for Goulet, ethics in development is interpreted as ‘means of means’. In his own words “ethics must somehow get inside the value dynamism of the instruments utilized by development agents and itself become a mean of means” (1995, p. 25). Interfering within political and economic matters, namely economic development and social change, ethical justifications should not only evaluate the ends of any particular course of social actions but also the means, economic choices and technical methods for instance, which have been used in order to attain those ends. In this way, ethics penetrate into the value context and meaning of any social action. At the end of the day, the whole development enterprise has to be critically subjected to ethical considerations. Thus, in response to the question of whether ethics is associated with end or means of human activity, Goulet purports that “[e]thics is concerned both with ends and means of human action” (1997, p. 1165).

According to Gasper (2006, p. 2), “[w]ell before Sen, Haq and Nussbaum, he [Goulet] advocated that authentic development aims toward the realization of human capabilities in all spheres and that economic growth and technological modernity must be treated as, at best, potential means towards considered human values, not vice versa”. In Goulet work, the meaning of the development is given by the phrase ‘human ascent’ which encompasses “the ascent of all men in their integral humanity including the economic, biological, psychological, social, cultural, ideological, spiritual, mystical, and transcendental dimensions” (Goulet, 1971, pp. 206-207).

Denis Goulet’s life tribute is identified with the unfolding, enrichment, and enhancement of the development ethics. There is no doubt that there are alternative dimensions that someone can investigate ethical consideration in the study of development. Critique on Goulet’s work is as polymorphous as the nature of the study of ethics in development. For instance, according to Gill (1973), Goulet introduces concepts as goals or strategies of development accession in an arbitrary way or fails address adequately the quantitative side of development. The importance is that Goulet sets a path by bringing the study of ethics and the value reflection in the concept of development.
5. Ethical Goals and Strategic of Development

For development ethicists, development is perceived as a relative good which is subordinated to the meaning of life. Each society gives answers to the fundamental inquiries of ‘what is good life’ and ‘what is good society’ in a distinct and unique way which is chiefly determined by the value system wherein any society has adopted. Goulet (1995, p. 27) writes, “[t]he discipline of development ethics is the conceptual cement that binds together multiple diagnoses of problem with their policy implications through an explicit phenomenological study of values which lays bare the value costs of alternative courses of action”. What goals ought to be posed and which strategies can be applied in order for these goals to be achieved, depends on the value system of each society.

Goulet (1971) stresses the importance of the dynamic of value change in determining what is to be defined as the ‘good life’ and the ‘good society’. In his words, “‘development’ is above all a question of values” (p. 205). Innovation and novel behavior patterns that development brings up usually embarrass the value system of a society. A conventional approach to development -in terms of social scientists’ study and practices- confronts values either as aids or as obstacles to attaining its goals. In other words, development goals are predetermined and values are used under a functional way by subordinating them. On the contrary, development ethics looks into dynamics of value change in each society and builds its paradigm on this idea. For development ethicists, innovation and novel behavior patterns can be good only if they can be adjusted with the value change and the meaning of the “good life” that every society espouses (Goulet, 1971).

5.1. Ethical Goals of development

Despite the fact that development is a relative good in terms of value issues, Goulet (1975, 1995) argues that there are three common acceptable universal values, namely, i) life-sustenance, ii) esteem, and iii) freedom that societies and individuals ought to investigate within a value based context of the “good life”. Theses universal accepted values compose the ethical goals of development.

i) **Life-sustenance** refers to the nurture of life. Goulet (1975, 88) points out that “one of development’s most important goals is to prolong men’s lives and render those men less ‘stunted’ by disease, extreme exposure to nature’s elements, and defenselessness against enemies.” The importance of life sustaining goods (e.g. food, shelter, healing or medicine) is generally acknowledged by all societies (Goulet, 1975, 87-88; 1995, 41-43). Because of life-sustenance as a value of universal significance, life-sustaining indices are also used as a measurement of development.

ii) **Esteem**: All human beings in all societies feel the necessity for respect, dignity, honor and recognition. The discussion involves esteem values and material prosperity, and, particularly, how esteem contends with “development” (in a sense of high rate of well-being, economical and technological advance). The more the material prosperity becomes the centre task of the development of a society the greater is the subordination of esteem to material affluence. The reaction of a society to the aforementioned material approach to development and its need for esteem can lead these societies to opposite directions, either towards “development” or towards resistance of it. In the first case, society tries to gain esteem via “development”, while at the latter it try to protect its profound esteem from inward “development”. Both
acts seek to gain esteem. Therefore, esteem is a universal goal whether “development” is accepted or not.

iii) Freedom is valued both from developed and non-developed societies as one of the components of the “good life”. Development ought to free humans from all servitudes. Even though there is a vast philosophical discussion on the term and the claim that freedom is enhanced by development is not self-evident, freedom is widely accepted as something beneficial and desirable. The debate lies again between freedom and material well-being. In a consumer society it can be accepted that the degree of freedom rises by material expansion, and thus constitutes an increase of well-being. On the other hand, in traditional societies, the value system may adopt a completely different confrontation over needs and wants. In any case, the point is that the matter of opinion is freedom (Goulet, 1995, p. 47). Furthermore, in the discussion over freedom, a significant distinction should be made between freedom from wants and freedom for wants. The former refers to the situation where human needs are adequately met, while the latter to the case where the gestations of new wants are controlled and individuals possess multiplied wants (Goulet, 1995, p. 50).

5.2. Ethical Strategies of development

In development ethics, strategic principles are normative judgments which provide both the notional and practical framework under within which development goals should be discussed and policy recommendations over those goals ought to be formulated. Accordingly, three ethical strategic are targeted (Goulet, 1975, 1995):

1) The abundance of goods in a sense that people need to have ‘enough’ in order to be more. In order to understand the notion of this principle, it becomes necessary to take into account the ontological nature of human beings. In an ontological sense, almost all organisms must go outside of them in order to be perfect. Only fully perfect beings would have no needs at all. Totally imperfect beings on the other hand would be incapable of needing certain goods. Humans are perfect (or imperfect) to such a degree that “men have needs because their existence is rich enough to be capable of development, but poor to realize all potentialities at one time or with their resources...At any given time man is less than he can become and what he can become depends largely on what he can have” (Goulet, 1975, pp. 129-30). Hence, men need ‘to have enough’ goods in order to be human. This must be investigated under the notion of a humanistic approach on how much is ‘enough’ for people in order to have a ‘good life’. There is not an absolute answer to the above issue. The response to the aforementioned inquiry is found in the historical relation among men and societies. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that underdevelopment (poverty, misery, diseases, mass famine etc) diminishes humanity. Thereby, ‘enough’ should be, at the minimum, all these goods that lead to cover biological needs, and additionally to free part of human energy in order for it to be allocated to a wider range of life aspects beyond covering first order needs. Altogether with the concept of ‘enough’ goods there is that of ‘superfluous’ wealth. At the same time, whereas underdevelopment hits two thirds of the globe, rich classes and nations consume with a superfluous way by exploiting nature recourses. This can be characterized inhuman in twofold: First, the maintenance of superfluous wealth along with underdevelopment conditions is inhuman both for those who have it and those who not have it. Second, the hyper-consumption manner of life in “developed” nations has distorted the way that the “good life” is perceived: “having more” (material goods,
wealth) leads to the notion of “being more” (successful, attractive, valuable) (Fromm 1999; 2005). Therefore, with regard to the strategic principle of the abundance of goods, three distinctive points are noteworthy. First, all individuals need to have ‘enough’ goods in order to realize themselves as human beings. Second, enough is not an absolutely relative measure but it can be defined in an objective basis. Third, both underdevelopment situations and superfluous wealth lead to dehumanization of life.

2) Universal solidarity. It concerns an ontological and philosophical issue. It can be distinctive in three points. First, all people be in agreement that beyond differences (in nationality, race, culture, status etc) a common ‘human-ness’ is present. Second, the earth as a cosmic body is governed by identical laws (physical roles) and all men dwell on this planet. Humans share a common occupation of the planet. In spite of differences in geography or climate, all humans are linked directly or indirectly with other people due to the fact of cohabitation into this cosmic body. The third component of the universal solidarity is derived by the all humans’ unity to destiny. In contrast, the existing state of affairs over the notion of universalism is in the opposite direction. People have not yet realized the need of solidarity. Controversial perspectives of development focus on narrow mercantile, strategic and ideological interests. Under the present worldwide conditions, solidarity can be achieved only through conflict against present rules and redefinition of the relations of power. Conflict is a prerequisite for solidarity. Here it is appropriate to state the importance of classes’ struggle and the institutional building role to the problem of development. Development ethicists assert that no universal solidarity exists to consolidate unfair social relations. The rebuilding of social relations and institutions in a basis of equality is more than necessary.

3) Participation. Theories of participation possess an important issue in the study of development. In general, the elite theory (e.g. Burnham 1960; Putnam 1977; Bottomore 1993) claims that decision making into a society concerns a ‘job’ for specialists in each particular field of life. Elite theory is made in a basis of “competence” that leads to an alleged efficiency within a society. For development ethics, participation is a matter for discussion. In Goulet (1995, p. 97) words, “[p]articipation is best conceptualized as a kind of moral incentive enabling hitherto excluded non-elites to negotiate new packages of material incentives benefiting them”. Even though development ethicists espouse that different kinds of development require different forms of participation, they argue that non-elite participation in decision-making enables people to mobilize and gives them control over their social destiny (Goulet, 1989).

6. The concept of the Authentic Development

This section puts forth the concept of authentic development and distinguishes it from the conventional notion of development or otherwise to the way that for many years the developed nations deal with the problem of underdevelopment. The adjective ‘authentic’ is used by Goulet (1996) to endow the term ‘development’ with all those traits that development should entail in order to be sustainable and human. Authentic development refers to the means and ends of human action, or in other words, to the vision of a better life and the way that this life can be accessed. As it is previously mentioned, development ought to respond to long-standing philosophical inquiries concerning the meaning of the good life, the foundation of justice in society and within societies, and the stance of human individual and societies towards nature.
“Providing satisfactory conceptual and institutional answers to these three questions is what constitutes authentic development” (Goulet 1996, p. 197).

For all people and any society in the world, authentic development ought to cover at least three objective aims that correspond to the aforementioned goals of development: a) to pursue more and better life-sustaining goods for all human beings, b) to create and improve the conditions that nurture the sense of esteem of individuals and societies, and c) to release humans from all forms of servitude (to nature, to others people, to institutions, to beliefs) (Goulet, 1995, pp. 47-48).

Any concept of human fulfillment is highly relative and as Goulet (1975, pp. 96-108) points out, development can be examined as a dialectical process. Development goals are usually interactive and no range exists among life protection, esteem and freedom. The essential point is that authentic development should not judge the abovementioned goals (as is conventionally the case) but these goals must become the criteria which authentic development itself must be judged (Goulet 1995, p. 48). In this mode, grading a nation high economic growth does not mean that it has followed an authentic development pattern. No authentic development can be achieved if massive consumption leads societies to an entirely material way of living emphasizing the notion of ‘have’ instead of ‘be’; if structural relations between nations and within them (among classes and individuals) are competitive and there is not equal distribution of development proceeds; if the exploitation of material resources leads to the destruction of ecological balance, if technological advantages are used to abolish freedom.

Authentic development, namely sustainability and human development is at the center of discussion for the last decades. In an effort to define it, during the progress of a seminar entitled “Ethical Issues in Development” that took place at the city of Colombo in Sri Lanka in 1986 (cited in Goulet, 1996, pp. 197-198), it is agreed that any definition of development should take into account at least the following six conceptual propositions:

1) Economic component, related with wealth, material life conditions (amenities), and their equal distribution of them.
2) Social ingredient, connected with social goods as health, housing, education, employment etc.
3) Political dimension, in a sense of the protection of human rights and political freedom.
4) Cultural elements, with accord to the idea that cultures cultivate people’s identity and self-esteem.
5) Ecological soundness, to promote a type of development that respects natural resources and forces for the restoration of the environment.
6) System of meaning, which refers to the way that a society perceives beliefs, symbols and values concerning the historical process and the meaning of life.

The aforementioned conceptual elements might reflect a consensus on what Goulet calls authentic development. Important element not fully described within the above analysis relate to issues of ethical value relativity and popular participation where overlap the notion of development.

With respect to the first issue, societal value systems are threatened by changes and social change is one of the main components of development. If we accept that development affects values of society and vice versa, the concept of ‘existence rationality’ should be investigated. However, what does this strange phrase mean? According to Goulet (1975, p. 188), “existence rationality defined as the process by
which a society devices a conscious strategy for obtaining its goals, given its ability to process information and the constrains weighting upon it”. In other words, existence rationality is considered to be the value system that exists in any society and determines the course of action undertaken to serve societal aims. The core value of existence rationality is to be concerned of the provision of those ingredients that ensure what any society defines as the good life. Thus, any change should be integrated in the principle of existence rationality determined by each society (Goulet, 1995).

Inasmuch as participation is one of the strategic principles of development as it is asserted in a former section, it is an essential constituent of authentic development. Elite problem-solvers (political elite, government officials, policy makers, specialists, executives of intergovernmental organization and so on) usually view development as a matter for competence. In contradiction to the conventional approach to issues of decision-making, authentic development offers a pluralistic alternative to it. The philosopher Ivan Illich underlines “Participation is deprofessionalization in all domains of life…so as to make ordinary people responsible for their own well-being” [cited in (Goulet, 1995, p. 91)]. For ethicists, participation is perceived in the sense that common people are involved not only as receivers of the privileges of development but also as agents of their destiny, building their model of development. To what extent populace participation should takes place is a matter for discussion, what is certain is that via participation at least three vital actions are performed: participation (i) offers to non-elites the ability to state goals independently of their social position, (ii) abolishes political patron, in a sense that ordinary people themselves become problem-solvers in their social environment, and (iii) launches individual and social formations to escape of the rationale of ‘do-it-yourself’ problems of micro level gaining access the macro arena of decision-making (Goulet, 1995, pp. 91-101).

7. Conclusion

The present analysis proposes an ethical view of development, introducing the reader to the fundamental principles of the development ethics paradigm. As mentioned previously, development ethics are related to an ethical reflection on the ends and means of any developmental endeavor. Ethics incorporates with “the value dynamisms of the instruments utilized by development agents” thus becoming a “means of the means” (Goulet, 1995, p. 25). Any instrumental action (an economic policy for instance) should be tested under an ethical deliberation taking into account the aforesaid ethical goals of life-sustenance, esteem and freedom. Development ethics renders to people and societies the way to be critically aware of the moral content of their choices. By the formulation of particular ethical strategies -abundance of goods, universal solidarity and participation - development ethicists show a way to find a road based on the principles of an authentic (human and sustainable) development. Through this process development ethics offers the ideal of hope; preserving hope “as the possibility of creating new possibilities” (Goulet, 1995, p. 28). Development ethics’ essential task is ‘human ascent’ to all relevant aspects of life and authentic development should be perceived as the means and the end in this course of action.
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